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COMMENT
JUDIC[AL INTERPRETATION OF CONVEYANCES
CONSIDERATION OF SUPPORT*

IN

The problem of construing the legal effect of a conveyance of land
by a grantor in consideration of support and maintenance during the
remainder of his life by the grantee has been presented quite frequently
to the courts This type of transaction has been regarded as sui generis
and hence not controlled by the usual rules applicable to conveyances
of land the consideration for which is the promise of the grantee to perform certain acts in the future The presumption is that the primary
purpose of the grantor is to secure the personal performance by the
grantee of the obligation assumed The consideration is not regarded as
an ordinary obligation, but rather one of peculiar character, imposing on
the grantee certain burdens which he must perform if he would retain
the property conveyed
The question usually arises when the grantor seeks to rescind and
cancel the conveyance because of the failure of the grantee to perform,
or when either the grantee or the grantor has died As a general rule,
courts of equity have upheld the rescission and cancellation of such
contracts, regardless of the type of estate created, and without any assumption that there is an executory contract involved Actually, there
is both a contract and a conveyance in the ordinary agreement, but the
courts almost always stress the contract Widely different theories have
been used by the courts to explain the results, depending in part at least
upon the words used in the conveying instrument as an indication of the
intention of the parties concerned Relief to the grantor by cancelling
or setting aside the conveyance has been given on one of several
grounds First, that the neglect or refusal of the grantee to comply with
his contract raises a presumption that he did not intend to comply with
it in the first instance, and hence the contract was fraudulent in its inception Second, the court finds a condition by using rules of judicial
construction, thereby holding obligations which in form rest in covenant
to rest in condition Third, the relief granted rests on the broad theory
that failure of consideration is in and of itself a ground for rescission
Fourth, the court feels that the remedies at law are inadequate Fifth,
equity will grant a reconveyance, because the conveyance creates an
implied trust which has been renounced by the grantee ' But before the
* A thorough and exhaustive search of the authorities from the approach
of the analysis used in this paper was made with very little success Since
the courts almost never discuss the estate concept in their decisions of
the cases presenting the problem, there is no legal writing on the subject
Instead the courts are primarily concerned with aiding the grantor either
by enforcing the promise of the grantee to support the grantor, if possible,
or by decreeing a cancellation of the deed The reason for this attitude
on the part of the courts arises out of the fact that in the usual case of
this type, the grantor has little or no wealth besides the land which he
has conveyed As a result, the only discussion of the problem with which
the paper is concerned was found in the treatises, and annotations dealing
with the equitable remedies of rescission and cancellation of deeds
14 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY (Perm ed, 1940) § 2058; 1 TirrAx ON
REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed., 1939) § 216; 12 C J S Cancellation of Instruments
§ 30; 9 AM Jui Cancellation of Instruments § 31; 76 A L R 743
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court can determine whether or not to grant a cancellation of the instrument, it must first seek to determine the precise estate or relationship which the transaction brought into being This paper is an analysis
attempting to determine the estates probably created in the light of the
Washington decisions
The preliminary step is to see what the cases seemingly hold as to the
estates created by the inter-vivos transfer between the grantor and the
grantee Though the Washington court has never discussed the problem,
the cases give some light upon the attitude of the court There are
several possibilities: An estate on a conditional or so-called "special"
limitation,2 a fee on condition subsequent, a life estate in the grantor
with a remainder in fee in the grantee, or a fee simple with a covenant
by the grantee to perform the contract accompanied by a condition subsequent giving the grantor the right to terminate the estate of the covenantor on its breach The most widely prevailing and perhaps the most
satisfactory construction is that there is an estate in fee with either
an express or implied condition subsequent In discussing this problem
Tiffany says:
Such a conveyance is not usually in terms on condition that the
support be furnished, but it is occasionally so expressed, and in
view of the ordinary attitude of the courts in favor of divesting
the grantee's title upon his failure to furnish support, the
analogy between such conveyances and those subject to a condition subsequent is sufficiently close to justify their consideration in the same connection I
It is well to note, however, that even the courts which do interpret
the conveyance as one on condition subsequent, (and the Washington
court is one of them) do not necessarily follow all the ordinary rules
for such estates, as to forfeiture for breach, waiver of a breach and
right of re-entry
In several cases the Washington court has treated the estate as being
on condition subsequent, without anywhere specifically discussing the
problem The court has more usually been concerned with the equitable
aspects of the situation Nevertheless, in two cases the court states that
the conveyance is on a condition, and since it regarded the title as having
passed at the time of the signing of the instrument, it must necessarily
mean it is a condition subsequent
For example in Payette v Ferrier,' one of the most important Washington cases on the problem, the court said:
The right of the parent to a return rests
upon the inability
of his child to render the service or perform the condition
upon which he was entrusted with the property I
The facts of the case were: A widower had conveyed his farm to his
daughter and her husband in 1882 by an instrument which recited that
the consideration for the conveyance was the promise of the grantees
to support the grantor for the remainder of his life In 1883, the
daughter and her husband mortgaged the premises to one Jacobus to
2
This is also called a determinable fee RESTATEMVENT, PRoPERTY (1936)
§ 23; 1 TIFFANY op cit sup'ra note 1, § 220
"1 TIFFANY op cit supra note 1 at 373
'20 Wash 479, 55 Pac 629 (1899); affirmed on rehearing, 31 Wash 43 71

Pac 546 (1903)
1Id at 483
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secure an alleged debt The daughter died in 1891, and her husband in
1892 Several years later the grantor sued the administrator of the
estates of the grantees to establish a lien on the land for support which
had not been furnished him for 1893 and subsequent years, or in the
alternative, for cancellation of the deed and mortgage The trial court
entered a decree granting the plaintiff a lien on the land for the support
for 1893 and on, but refused to rescind the conveyance On appeal, the
supreme court rescinded the deed on two grounds (1) the death of the
grantee, and (2) because of the mortgage of the property by the grantee
In support the court cited the Wisconsin case of Bogie v Bogie8 which
holds that conveyances of this type are peculiar and must be dealt with
on principles not applicable to ordinary conveyances
Another case in which the court in effect found a condition subsequent was Ford v Kimble 7 There Levi and Rebecca Ford entered into
an agreement with their son David, on December 1, 1881, under which
they deeded all their real property to him in consideration of their
maintenance and support during the remainder of their natural lives
By mistake in the deed the land was stated to be in Section 20 instead
of the correct section, 25 On the same day, David and his wife, in conformity with the agreement, leased the farm back to his father and
mother for the rest of their lives at a nominal rental David Ford then
went into possession and lived with his parents In 1892 the mistake in
the deed was discovered, and in July of that year Levi and Rebecca
made a quit-claim deed of their farm to their daughter Clara, correctly
describing the land David's wife having died in the meantime, David
and his minor son, by guardian ad litem, brought an action to set aside
the quit-claim deed on the ground of fraud, and to reform the deed he
had received from Levi and Rebecca Ford The court cancelled the
quit-claim deed and entered a decree that the deed to David and his wife
be reformed to contain the agreement of David to support his parents,
and that:
upon failure to so properly maintain, care for and support
them, then said deed shall become void and said property
revert to said Levi and Rebecca Ford"
Although the language as used by the court seems to create an estate
on "special limitation", in view of the attitude of the court it is more
probable that an estate on condition subsequent was meant
From the approach of the court in the two decisions above, it would
seem that the grantee has an estate in fee, but if he breaches the agreement, the grantor can ordinarily do any one of three things That is,
he may waive the breach, sue to rescind the conveyance, or sue at law
for damages If the grantor waives the breach, his heirs cannot subsequently upon his death sue for a forfeiture of the estate 9 Some courts
take the view that where the contract for support is embodied in a
separate instrument from the conveying instrument only an action for
damages will lie 10 This is not the view of the Washington court, how'41 Wis 219 (1876)
741 Wash. 573, 84 Pac 414 (1906)
8Id at 576

'26 C J S Deeds § 148; Wilkes v Groover, 138 Ga 407, 75 S E 353
(1912)
20 Lavely v. Nonemaker, 212 Cal. 380, 298 Pac. 976 (1931); Dixon v
Milling, 102 Miss 449, 69 So 804, 43 L R A (N s ) 916 (1912); Anderson
v Gaines, 156 Mo 664, 57 S W 726 (1900)
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ever When the grantor seeks to rescind the contract and cancel the conveyance, one authority states that:
even when the conveyance is regarded as subject to such
a condition, and the condition is referred to as a basis for the
grant of relief, the relief which is given is occasionally equitable
in character, that is, it takes the form of a decree for rescission
or cancellation of the conveyance, rather than of a re-entry or
action of ejectment, as in the ordinary case of a conveyance
subject to a condition subsequent 11
However, there are some cases which hold that there must be a re-entry
by the grantor, or its equivalent 12 This appears to refer in the ordinary
case to the necessity of an actual assertion by the grantor of his intention to claim a forfeiture 11
In at least one Washington case, Gardner v Frederick,14 the court has
based the decrees of rescission merely on the injustice of allowing the
grantee to retain the land without performing the promise on the faith
of which the conveyance was made to him This was done with no statement as to what type of estate in the grantee was being defeated
The Washington court, in discussing the obligation to support has
stated that it is personal and cannot be assigned or transferred without
the grantor's consent In an early case, Payette v Ferrier, the court
said:
The duty of support is a personal and continuing one It is not
assignable, but to be performed by them only, so when the
child attempts to transfer or assign, the parent has a right of
rescission or cancellation of the conveyance The convenants
of the grantees are personal and die with them "
In another Washington case, the court adhered to the view of the
Payette case, supra, and said that:
The obligation of David, the son, to his aged parents, was
personal, and could not be avoided or assigned to any other
person without the parents' consent 1"
In the lastest case to present the problem, the court upheld the converse of the proposition That is, although the services are personal,
they can be assigned with the consent of the grantor 1
Clearly, the statement that the services are personal sounds more
in convenant than condition, but a breach of a convenant does not
affect the estate conveyed Since the obligation is personal to the
grantee, it would seem to be a personal covenant and not one running
with the land, but the cases are not clear on the point The court in
effect held that this personal obligation did create some sort of a charge
on the land in one case, in that where the grantee had mortgaged the
property the court regarded it as having the same effect as a deed, and
1"1 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed, 1939) 373
12Wilkes v Groover, 138 Ga 407, 75 S E 353 (1912); Richter v Richter,
111 Ind 456, 12 N E 698 (1887); Blum v Bush, 86 Mich 206, 49 N W 142
(1891)

"3This can be done by an actual entry, a demand for possession or at
the very least a declaration of intention to claim a forfeiture
'
96 Wash 324 165 Pac 85 (1917)
"Payette v Ferrier, 20 Wash 479, 483, 55 Pac 629 (1899)
""Ford v Kimble, 41 Wash. 573. 578, 84 Pac 414 (1906)

17Hesselgrove v Mott 23 Wn (2d) 270 160 P (2d) 521 (1945)
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thus an attempt by the grantee to rid himself of the obligation "I It is
clear that the land involved in the conveyance is regarded as essential
to the performance of the contract
In Gustin v Crockett 9 the court cancelled the deed which on its face
seemingly created in the grantor a life estate in the property with a
remainder in fee in the grantee When the grantee had the grantor
evicted twice from the land under writs of restitution, the court felt it
was a breach of the agreement, and caused the grantee to forfeit the
estate In that case the plaintiff was purchasing seven lots on installment
payments When he became unable to pay off the remainder of the purchase price, he borrowed the money from his deceased son's former
wife, Laura Crockett, and her husband, in return for a conveyance of
the property to the daughter-in-law The court apparently construed
the deed as passing a fee title to the grantee subject to the condition
that the grantor be allowed to live on the property for the rest of his
life 20 The plaintiff lived on the property for several years, during which
he made improvements and paid the taxes Meanwhile, the defendant
Laura Crockett had deeded the property to her husband and they had
mortgaged it Thereafter the grantor was twice ejected from the land
under writs of restitution Although there was no agreement for support
involved, the court treated it as the same sort of a conveyance, and
decreed a forfeiture for breach of the agreement
Another aspect of the problem arises where the grantee does perform
the agreement, but dies before the grantor ' The courts of the various
states are split on the result For example, some courts hold that where
the grantee performed the contract until the date of his death no reconveyance can be had by the grantor 21 If on the death of the grantee,
his heirs refuse to comply with the conditions of the deed, a cancellation
of the deed is authorized in some courts 22 This result is in line with the
usual result where a true condition subsequent is found 23 Other jurisdictions hold that so long as anyone in privity with the deceased
grantee's infant children, to whom title passed, complies with the contract, the deed will not be cancelled Washington, in contrast with the
majority, follows the view that the death of the grantee puts an end
to the obligation to support, and the grantor is entitled to rescission
of the contract, even though the grantee performed up until his death
This is in conformity with the Washington view that the contract for
support is personal in character, the grantor being entitled to the care
and attention of the person who promised to furnish the support In
the Payette case the grantor was allowed to rescind as against the ad28See note 4 supra
" 51 Wash 67, 97 Pac 1091 (1908)

so There is nothing in the case to indicate what the specific words used
in the deed were, but the court said: "The agreement on the part of the
respondent Laura Crockett and her husband that the appellant should
occupy the property during their lives was an integral part of the grant
itself, and was in part the consideration for the grant"
21
This result is achieved by those courts which use the approach of
presumed fraud in the inception of the contract, since if the grantee performs until he dies, there was no fraudulent intent on his part
22Cree v Sherfy, 13& Ind 354, 37 N E 787 (1894); Cross v Carson, 8
Blackf (rnd) 138, 44 Am. Dec 742 (1846) In addition see 43 L R A 928,
and 34 A L R 136
23 1 TIFFANY op cit supra note 11, § 190
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ministrator of the estates of the deceased grantees The court held that
the death of the grantee was a breach of the condition subsequent
Under the rule as laid down by this case, the heirs of the grantee will
not be allowed to perform the contract
Another question arises where the grantor dies after a breach of the
agreement Most courts regard the agreement involved as being personal
to the grantor, in that he is the only one who can rescind the conveyance for failure to perform the contract for support In the case of
Storey v Gaisord2 the court recognized the general rule that the
grantor is the only one who can seek a forfeiture, but since the grantor
had attempted to rescind the contract before his death, the heirs were
allowed to have the deeds cancelled 2 The court quoted from the leading case of White v Bailey that:
The only other question deemed worthy of consideration is
whether any person other than the grantor can prosecute this
right of rescission If the plaintiff were a mere assignee of the
cause of action, his right to sue would be gravely doubtful,
but he is the representative of the estate to which it belongs,
and sues as such
Nor is the cause of action one which dies
with the person 26
The probable result of the failure of the grantor to attempt to rescind
before his death would be that the court would construe it as a waiver
It is clear, however, that the grantor cannot transfer his power of
termination under the common law rules referring to the transferability
of such a power, but those rules cease to apply after the grantor has
started to exercise his power of termination 27
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the courts do not
follow the usual construction of an estate on condition subsequent,
since if the usual rules were followed, the grantor could rescind the
contract for non-performance by the grantee But the authorities are
practically unanimous in holding that the failure to support the grantor
can be taken advantage of only by the grantor 28
The remaining problem concerns the attitude of the court toward a
conveyance of the type under discussion where the land has been transferred to a third person If the estate created is a fee simple subject to
a condition subsequent, the grantee can pass good title, but the transferee assumes the burden of performing the condition That is, the
condition is a limitation on the estate conveyed, and it is also directly
related to the land which is transferred The grantor can cancel the
conveyance if the transferee fails to perform However, the cases are by
no means uniform on this point One possible distinguishing fact is that
some of the deeds contain the agreement, while in others the contract
to support is in a separate instrument The Payette case is an example
of the first type of conveyance, and the court held there that since the
24136 Wash. 378 240 Pac 9 (1925)
" The grantor had attempted to persuade his son, the grantee to cancel
the deeds or reconvey the property to him, but the grantee had refused
Apparently no legal action of any kind had been started before the grantor
died--o65
W Va 573, 64 S E 1019, 1022, 23 L R A (N s) 232 (1909)
27 3 SnIMs ON FUTuRE INTERESTS (1936)
§ 716; RESTATEMENT, Paorzrr
(1936) § 160
11Malichi v Malichi, 189 Minn 121, 248 N W 723 (1933); 1 TinFAxy
ON REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed, 1939) 380; 26 C J S Deeds § 148
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agreement was embodied in the deed the mortgagee took with constructive notice, and so was in no better position with regards to the breach
than was the grantee In the Gardner case, the contract for support was
in a separate instrument which had been cancelled by the parties by
mutual consent The court held that the grantor could not get a reconveyance since the property had been conveyed to third persons
before the grantor sought rescission of the deed The distinction appears to be sound, as the transferee shouldn't be forced to forfeit the
estate where he has no means of knowing of the existence of the agreement
In conclusion, although the Washington court has in effect treated
the estate created as a fee on condition subsequent, the question has
never been in issue and passed upon by the court It is perhaps more accurate to say that Washington is in accord with the vast majority of
states in the viewpoint that such conveyances are based upon a consideration so peculiar that a total or partial failure of this consideration
requires relief of a special character and in giving accordingly such
relief to the grantor as the circumstances and equities of the particular
case may allow
JANE E DOWDLE

